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 Mexico is in a state of siege.  In recent years, organized crime and drug-related violence 
have escalated dramatically, taking innocent lives and leaving the country mired in bloodshed.  
The Mexican government, under the leadership of President Felipe Calderón, has responded in 
part by significantly extending the reach of its security operations, deploying thousands of 
federal police officers and military troops to combat the activities of drug cartels, and 
collaborating with the United States on an extensive regional security plan known as the Mérida 
Initiative.
1
  In the midst of the security crisis, however, the government has somewhat 
paradoxically adopted judicial reforms that protect human rights and civil liberties rather than 
erode them, specifically the presumption of innocence standard in criminal proceedings and the 
implementation of oral trials.
2
  Assuming that the new laws on the books will be applied in 
practice, these reforms represent an important commitment on the part of the government to 
uphold human rights and civil liberties.  This is in stark contrast to the infamous judicial reforms 
in Colombia—the institutionalization of anonymous or “faceless” prosecutions in special 
courts—implemented after a surge in leftist and cartel brutality, and the murders of several 
prominent public and judicial officials in the 1980s.
3
 
 In many ways, there is a strong parallel between the security crises and drug-related 
violence in both countries, yet Mexico has rejected Colombia’s justicia sin rostro, or “faceless 
justice” approach, which the human rights community fiercely condemned.  The combination of 
their similar experiences with the “war on drugs” and their relatively divergent policy responses 
provide fertile ground for a case study on what prompted Mexico to promote human rights and 
                                                 
1
 JUNE S. BEITTEL, MEXICO’S DRUG RELATED VIOLENCE 2 (2009). 
2
 PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA, FIRMA EL PRESIDENTE FELIPE CALDERÓN DECRETO DE REFORMA 
CONSTITUCIONAL EN MATERIA DE JUSTICIA PENAL Y SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA (2008), 
http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/prensa/notas/?contenido=36426. 
3
 Robert Weiner, War by Other Means: Colombia’s Faceless Courts, 30 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS (1996), 
http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=98485319. 
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civil liberties through its adoption of the innocence standard and oral trials, despite the security 
threat on the ground.  It is important to note at the onset of this discussion that not all reforms 
can be characterized as completely advancing or undermining the principles of human rights and 
civil liberties in either country; indeed some of Colombia’s reforms were lauded for promoting 
human rights and civil liberties,
4
 whereas there is concern that Mexico has not gone far enough 
to advance them.
5
  Nonetheless, this paper narrowly focuses on the comparison between 
Colombia’s faceless justice approach and Mexico’s adoption of these particular reforms.  In 
initiating the dialogue on this divergence, the paper will evaluate some hypotheses that could 
account for Mexico’s reforms, and argue that a lack of reform alternatives and the failure of 
Colombia’s approach were primary causes of Mexico’s reform strategy.   
 In the first section, the paper will provide an overview of the security conditions and 
subsequent faceless justice reform approach in Colombia, highlighting some of the consequences 
of this approach.  Second, the paper will describe the security context in Mexico and its recent 
judicial reforms involving the implementation of the innocence standard and oral trials, which 
stand in contrast to Colombia’s reforms involving anonymous prosecutions.  In the third section, 
it will assess three possible justifications for why Mexico turned away from Colombia’s use of 
anonymous prosecutions and instead passed a constitutional amendment to ensure the innocence 
                                                 
4
 For example, Colombia’s reform efforts led to the adoption of a new Constitution in 1991, which contained 
provisions that limit the detention period before trial and prohibit torture and cruel, inhumane, or degrading 
punishment, among other praiseworthy provisions.  However, these provisions were largely undercut by the 
institutionalization of anonymous prosecutions in special courts and the retention of the military’s authority to hold 
secret trials against its personnel in cases of human rights abuses.  See PETER DESHAZO & JUAN ENRIQUE VARGAS, 
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: AN ASSESSMENT 7-8 (2006); Donald T. Fox & Anne Stetson, The 1991 
Constitutional Reform: Prospects for Democracy and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
139, 156-62 (1992); Luz Estella Nagle, Colombia’s Faceless Justice: A Necessary Evil, Blind Impartiality or 
Modern Inquisition?, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 881, 912-15 (2000). 
5
 While human rights groups have praised Mexico for its reforms involving the protection of due process rights, such 
as the presumption of innocence and the transition to an accusatory, oral trial system for criminal proceedings, they 
have criticized the continued use of arraigo, detentions that allow for confinement without formal charges for up to 
80 days for organized crime suspects.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY: MEXICO 1-2 (2009); 
MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE: PUBLIC SECURITY AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MEXICO 31-32 (2008).  
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standard and oral trials in criminal proceedings.  The paper will posit that the absence of viable 
reform alternatives available to policymakers and the lessons learned from Colombia’s 
experience served as an impetus for Mexico’s reform strategy, and conclude with an invitation 
for further discussion on this topic.   
I. Colombia: Security Conditions and “Faceless Justice” 
The 1980s marked a particularly dark era for Colombians.  Guerilla warfare consumed 
daily life for urban and rural populations who suffered from the ceaseless violence between 
armed leftist groups, cartels, and right-wing paramilitaries.  The carnage intensified by the mid-
1980s, as Pablo Escobar, the kingpin of the Medellín cartel, ordered a rash of killings of top 
public officials in order to fight extradition to the United States.
6
  This was followed by the M-19 
rebel group’s attack on the Palace of Justice in 1985, leaving 11 justices dead.7   The violence of 
the next few years culminated in the mass kidnappings and killings of judges, lawyers, human 
rights advocates, government officials, and two presidential candidates.
8
  Meanwhile, the justice 
system lacked the institutional capacity and incentives to issue guilty verdicts, as judges quickly 
realized that convictions virtually guaranteed their own death sentences.
9
  Thus, “perpetrators of 
most of the killings enjoyed total impunity…[and] the judiciary remained ineffective and shell-
shocked.”10  In order to strengthen the judiciary and respond to the violence, the government 
adopted a new constitution and code of criminal procedure in 1991, which institutionalized the 
faceless justice reform approach through the creation of special courts which secured the 
anonymity of judges, prosecutorial authorities, and witnesses.
11
 
                                                 
6
 Nagle, supra note 4, at 896, 901-03.   
7
 Id., at 902. 
8
 Id., at 908. 
9
 Id., at 913. 
10
 Id., at 910. 
11
 Id., at 910, 913. 
Mohr - 5 
 
The special courts had jurisdiction over crimes involving drug and arms trafficking, 
extortion, oil pipeline sabotage, and acts of terrorism.
12
  Prosecutors for these cases cavalierly 
issued warrants (if they were even requested), which gave law enforcement broad discretion over 
seizures, surveillance, and detentions, and the investigation proceeded in complete secrecy.
13
  In 
court, there was no right to a public trial and the identity of the presiding judge was unknown to 
all parties but the prosecutor.
14
  Courts were enclosed in bunkers, which contained one-way 
mirrors and voice distorters to protect court personnel.
15
  Furthermore, the defense counsel had 
no access to witness statements, which were sealed by the witness’s fingerprints rather than 
signature.
16
  Neither the accused nor the defense counsel had a right to challenge witnesses, or 
examine or contest evidence; in fact, if the accused requested access to evidence, she would be 
required to testify.
17
  At the appellate level, the judge also retained anonymity, and the courts 
only accepted written arguments.
18
 
The primary objective of the faceless justice approach was to advance the functionality of 
the judicial system at the height of the security crisis by preventing impunity and minimizing the 
safety risks to judicial officials and witnesses.
19
  However, this approach ultimately failed to 
fulfill its purpose.  First, the system served as a platform for corruption: judges, law enforcement 
officers, and administrative staff involved in the process frequently solicited bribes in exchange 
for destroying evidence or dismissing charges.
20
  In one case, the Cali cartel was funneling illicit 
                                                 
12
 Id., at 917. 
13
 Id., at 918, 920-21; Weiner, supra note 3. 
14
 Nagle, supra note 4, at 910-11. 
15
 Sandra Bibiana Flórez, Justicia sin rostro en Colombia: amor y odio, PROCESO, Feb. 12, 2007, 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/prisma.html?sec=3&nta=48137. 
16
 Nagle, supra note 4, at 919. 
17
 Id., at 920; Weiner, supra note 3. 
18
 Nagle, supra note 4, at 923. 
19
 See id., at 912-13. 
20
 Id., at 914-15; Nidia Marín, Impide la corrupción crear “jueces sin rostro,” EL SOL DE MÉXICO, Feb. 3, 2008, 
http://www.oem.com.mx/laprensa/notas/n581463.htm. 
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payments to a law enforcement officer associated with the special courts’ investigative unit in 
order to buy immunity and plan attacks against anonymous judges.
21
  Intelligence reports also 
revealed that 42 narcotrafficking groups formed an alliance to pay off various judicial and 
political officials to subvert the system.
22
 
Second, judges, prosecutors, and witnesses as a whole were still highly vulnerable to 
assassinations and death threats.
23
  Cartel members would often trace judges’ identification codes 
back to their names and follow vehicles that entered through the bunker’s access points.24  In 
1992, for example, Myriam Rocío Vélez, a faceless judge in a case involving the murder of a 
prominent newspaper manager, was gunned down with her escorts in front of her son.
25
  Court 
personnel often sold the identities of protected witnesses, who were then murdered following 
their testimony.
26
  Moreover, widespread terror continued to plague urban and rural areas of the 
country, despite the new procedures, due to inter-cartel rivalries and a revived guerrilla campaign 
against the state.
27
  While murder rates for judicial personnel experienced a slight decline after 
the reformed procedures and special courts were in place, security analysts attribute the reduction 
to the government’s willingness to ease sentencing for traffickers who turned themselves in to 
authorities rather than the government’s faceless justice approach.28   
 Third, the attempt to strengthen judicial capacity and “securitize” criminal proceedings 
through this approach ultimately undermined the legitimacy of the judicial system.  Ongoing 
corruption scandals and allegations of impunity further hampered the government’s efforts to 
                                                 
21
 Nagle, supra note 4, at 915. 
22
 Flórez, supra note 11. 
23
 Marín, supra note 16. 
24
 See Flórez, supra note 11.  
25
 Id. 
26
 Nagle, supra note 4, at 952. 
27
 Id., at 914. 
28
 Id. 
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cultivate a reputation of judicial integrity and impartiality.
29
  Faceless reforms also came at the 
price of human rights and civil liberties.  For example, the government sacrificed the 
fundamental tenets of due process for a system based on anonymity: the accused, subject to a 
secret trial, had no right to confront his/her accuser, and was forced to present a defense against 
undisclosed evidence and testimony under a presumption of guilt.
30
  Little proof was necessary 
to confirm criminal allegations, and judges escaped official scrutiny and accountability due to 
their ability to render anonymous decisions.
31
  Because the system made it possible for witnesses 
to present capricious claims against an enemy, it provided a conduit for revenge and blood 
feuds.
32
  Furthermore, the Organization of American States denounced the faceless justice 
approach, emphasizing its violation of the American Convention on Human Rights and basic 
principles of the rule of law.
33
  
 By the end of the 1990s, despite its flaws, the Colombian Congress approved legislation 
that would extend the operation of the faceless justice system, albeit in a modified form.
34
  
Shortly thereafter, protests ensued and human rights groups and the international community 
began to apply more pressure on the Colombian government.
35
  Amid a great deal of 
controversy, on April 6, 2000 the Constitutional Court declared that the anonymous procedures 
and special courts violated due process and struck down the legislation, marking the end of the 
faceless justice system.
36
  Over the past decade, the Colombian government has continued to 
                                                 
29
 Flórez, supra note 11. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Nagle, supra note 4, at 950. 
33
 INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, THIRD REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION 
IN COLOMBIA (1999), http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colom99en/chapter-5.htm. 
34
 U.K. HOME OFFICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT – COLOMBIA 
(2002), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c2b4e097.html.  
35
 Larry Rohter, Secretive Colombian Courts Survive Protests over Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/20/world/secretive-colombian-courts-survive-protests-over-rights.html.  
36
 U.K. HOME OFFICE, supra note 30. 
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struggle with the implementation of an overarching reform plan that would enhance domestic 
security while developing democratic institutions and strengthening the rule of law.
37
   
II. Mexico: Security Conditions and a New Reform Approach 
The current security crisis in Mexico in many regards resembles the Colombian 
experience described above.  Since the early 2000s, violence and narcoterrorism activities have 
grown steadily in response to the government’s aggressive security strategies and inter-cartel 
competition for market dominance.
38
  Over the past two years, drug-related violence escalated to 
a “level of intensity and ferocity that has exceeded previous periods of [the crisis].”39  While 
exact statistics are difficult to obtain, data indicate a drastic rise in murders of public officials 
and private citizens since 2006.
40
  The Mexican government estimates that there were 5,600 
drug-related killings in 2008—a 110 percent increase over 2007 figures.41  In the early months of 
2009, the murder rate rose 146 percent from the equivalent period in 2008; if this rate continues, 
Mexico will surpass rates in Colombia at “the peak of the mayhem unleashed by Pablo Escobar 
in the 1980s.”42   
As in Colombia, Mexican judges, prosecutors, and other public officials have been 
targets of cartel violence.
43
  Judges and other judicial personnel overseeing narcotrafficking and 
organized crime cases receive death threats and are kidnapped or worse if they are not complicit 
with the demands of drug traffickers.  In 2008, for example, armed assailants murdered Ernesto 
                                                 
37
 See JUNE S. BEITTEL & CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, COLOMBIA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 19, 24 (2009). 
38
 BEITTEL, supra note 1, at 10-11; Francisco González, Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal, 108 CURRENT HISTORY 72 
(2009).  
39
 BEITTEL, supra note 1, at summary. 
40
 Id., at 10. 
41
 Latin Am. Newsletters, Mexico-U.S.: The Drugs War—Dissecting the threat perceived in Washington, LATIN AM. 
SEC. & STRATEGIC REV., January 2009, at 4. 
42
 Latin Am. Newsletters, Cartels add political dimension to ‘drugs war’,” LATIN AM. SEC. & STRATEGIC REV., Feb. 
2009, at 6. 
43
 Jeremy Schwartz, Judges Latest Target in Mexico Drug War, COX NEWS SERV., February 2, 2008, 
http://www.coxwashington.com/hp/content/reporters/stories/2008/02/02/MEXICO_JUDGES02_COX.html. 
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Palacios Lopez, a judge overseeing a high profile trafficking case.
44
  More recently, attacks in 
northern Mexico left a federal prosecutor dead, along with 16 other individuals.
45
  In addition, 
last year authorities uncovered a plot to attack the public prosecutor’s office along the border.46   
In response, the Mexican government has adopted a mano dura security strategy similar 
to Colombia’s, deploying over 45,000 soldiers and 5,000 police units and launching full-scale 
military operations across the country.
47
  The government has also entered into an agreement 
with the United States under the Mérida Initiative, which provides $1.6 billion over the course of 
three years to combat drug trafficking and organized crime.
48
  Simultaneously, Mexico has 
initiated a series of rule-of-law reforms to strengthen judicial institutions and improve the formal 
administration of justice, particularly in criminal proceedings.  However, unlike Colombia, 
Mexico has discarded the option of anonymous prosecutions and instead has elected a number of 
reforms that demonstrate a greater respect for human rights and civil liberties.
49
  Among these 
reforms are the adoption of the presumption of innocence standard for criminal defendants and 
the transition to oral trials.
50
   
 In June 2008, President Calderón signed into effect a constitutional amendment to 
fundamentally transform the criminal justice system by establishing explicit constitutional rights 
                                                 
44
 Judge murdered in Northern Mexico, NOTIEMAIL, Jan. 22, 2008, 
http://news.notiemail.com/noticia.asp?nt=11930591&cty=200; Manuel Roig-Franzia, Arrests, Slaying Underscore 
Mexico's Drug Crisis, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012203439.html. 
45
 Prosecutor, 16 other dead in Mexico border attacks, INDIAN EXPRESS, July 30, 2009, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/prosecutor-16-other-dead-in-mexico-border-a/495993/. 
46
 Marching as to War; Mexico, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TDGDRGSG.  
47
 VANDA FELBAB-BROWN, THE VIOLENT DRUG MARKET IN MEXICO AND LESSONS FROM COLOMBIA 19 (2009).  
48
 FELBAB-BROWN, supra note 42, at 20; Kindra Mohr, The Mérida Initiative: An Early Assessment of U.S.-Mexico 
Security, 9 PATERSON REV. 71, 75 (2008). 
49
 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3. 
50
 Id. 
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under Article 20 for two new elements: the presumption of innocence and oral trials.
51
  The 
amendment swept through both the Congress, with 462 votes in favor out of 468, and the Senate, 
with a vote of 71-to-25, and subsequently passed with the support of a majority of the state 
legislatures.
52
  While the Mexican Supreme Court noted in an isolated case that the presumption 
of innocence was implied in the Constitution, the standard was not binding until the 2008 
amendment.
53
  In the past, law enforcement agencies “had the monopoly over investigative and 
prosecutorial actions…[and] in practice all detainees were regarded as guilty until proven 
innocent.”54 
 One practical consequence of the innocence standard involves the role of public 
prosecutors.  Traditionally, the Mexican criminal justice system has provided prosecutors with a 
great deal of latitude when investigating crimes, even granting them the de facto authority to 
make a preliminary, “pseudo-judicial” determination on a suspect’s guilt.55 In effect, prosecutors 
were functioning as judges by issuing statements that were analogous to binding legal 
decisions.
56
  Coupled with a process of closed, written arguments instead of oral trials, this 
                                                 
51
 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MÉXICANOS, art. 20 (as amended), 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/1.pdf; Manuel Roig-Franzia, Mexico Revises its Justice System, 
WASH. POST, June 18, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/17/AR2008061702334_pf.html; MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., 
supra note 3.  It is worth noting that the original 1917 Constitution contained a guarantee of a “public trial” by a 
judge or jury of literate citizens, which, for all intents and purposes, was never applied in practice.  See 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MÉXICANOS, art. 20, § 6, 
http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Mexico/Spanish/constitution-mex.html.  
52
 Id.; Katerina Ossenova, Mexico Senate passes judicial reform bill, JURIST, Mar. 6, 2008, 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/03/mexico-senate-passes-judicial-reform.php. 
53
 Carlos Rios Espinoza, Redesigning Mexico’s Criminal Procedure: The State’s Turning Point, 15 SW. J. L. & 
TRADE AM. 53, 75-76 (2008). 
54
 Carlos Macias, Mexico Revamps Its Judicial System, AMERICAS SOC’Y, June 19, 2008, http://as.americas-
society.org/article.php?id=1112; Beatriz Magaloni, Enforcing the Autocratic Political Order and the Role of Courts, 
in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 180, 190-91 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 
2008). 
55
 Interview by Cheryl Corley with John Mill Ackerman Rose, Professor, Institute for Legal Research at the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico (June 19, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91684101. 
56
 Id. 
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practice encouraged abuse of power and bred corruption within the judicial system.
57
  The 2008 
reforms restructured prosecutors’ offices based on the presumption of innocence standard; they 
are now only able to gather evidence and present the case to court, and the judge is responsible 
for giving fair weight to each side.  Discretionary abuse is subject to appeal.  The new standard 
has created a “real separation…between those who decide the guiltiness and those who 
investigate and accuse the suspect.”58  
 The constitutional amendment also revolutionizes the process in which courts conduct 
criminal trials.  The accused will no longer be subject to closed hearings based on written 
arguments, which, fostered immunity and undermined civil liberties and human rights 
principles.
59
  Rather, the amendment calls for the implementation of public, oral trials “in an 
effort to ensure transparency and the opportunity to fair legal representation.”60 The new trial 
procedures involve extensive training for judges, lawyers, and judicial personnel, in addition to 
the construction of new court facilities to comply with the new trial requirements.
61
  Due to the 
similarity to U.S. criminal trials, training programs and educational exchanges are already under 
way between U.S. and Mexican institutions.
62
  In fact, Southwestern University Law School has 
received multi-year financing through the Mérida Initiative for its training-exchange program 
with the Law Department of the Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey.
63
  
 In contrast to Colombian reforms in the 1990s, the use of anonymity in the investigatory 
and adjudicatory stages of the criminal process is notably absent from the reforms in Mexico.  
                                                 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Macias, supra note 50. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. 
62
 USAID/Mexico’s Role in the Merida Initiative: Hearing Before the Subcomm.on State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th
 
Cong. (2009) (statement of Rodger D. Garner, USAID 
Mission Dir. to Mex.), http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2009/ty090310.html. 
63
 Id. 
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Indeed, human rights advocates and many legal professionals have drawn attention to Mexico’s 
distance from Colombia’s approach, and hailed the constitutional amendment as a significant 
advancement for human rights and civil liberties.
64
  Nonetheless, major changes will not occur 
overnight, given that the government has until 2016 to fully implement the reforms.
65
  Thus, it 
will take time before policymakers and analysts can evaluate progress in terms of the reforms’ 
impact on crime, human rights and civil liberties, and the overall advancement of the rule of law.  
However, it is clear that, despite facing similar threats to domestic security (a time in which a 
state may be more inclined to disregard human rights and civil liberties), Mexico’s adoption of 
these two elements into its criminal justice system fall far on the other end of the human rights 
and civil liberties “spectrum” as compared to Colombia’s faceless justice approach.  What still 
remains unclear is why the Mexican government pursued these reforms.  The next section of the 
paper will explore some potential explanations for this phenomenon. 
III. Possible Justifications for Mexico’s Reform Strategy 
Although it passed with overwhelming support at both the state and federal levels, 
Mexico’s historic 2008 constitutional amendment was not without immense debate.  
Negotiations repeatedly stalled, and political jockeying over the reforms consumed the terms of 
President Calderón’s two predecessors, as policymakers faced the challenge of balancing 
security measures with protecting the rights of the general population.
66
  Despite significant 
media coverage of the amendment’s passage, there appears to be little evidence to explain the 
government’s motivations for adopting these two particular reforms as opposed to Colombia’s 
approach.  In reality, it is most likely that a multitude of factors contributed to the eventual 
                                                 
64
 MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., supra note 3; TRANS-BORDER INSTITUTE, JUSTICE IN 
MEXICO 10 (2008). 
65
 Roig-Franzia, supra note 47. 
66
 Id. 
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acceptance of a transformed criminal justice system.  However, in hopes of narrowing the 
universe of possibilities to what may have been some of the core factors in the reform process, 
this paper will assess three hypotheses.  
A. Hypothesis I: Public Demand 
First, it is possible that elected officials were responding to public demands for more 
judicial transparency and constitutional safeguards to prevent state encroachment on human 
rights and civil liberties.  Prior to the amendment’s adoption, a Gallup poll revealed that only 37 
percent of survey respondents in 2007 had confidence in the judiciary, suggesting that the public 
would likely favor judicial reforms.
67
  This is unsurprising, given widespread discontent with the 
state’s historical abuse of authority and use of the judiciary as an instrument to suppress political 
dissidence and empower the ruling class.
68
  For many, the judicial system “not only offer[ed] 
what it can’t deliver, it [became]…one of the causes of the poverty and injustice that characterize 
Mexico.”69  The deep public mistrust of the judiciary stems in part from its failure to hold public 
officials accountable for state-sponsored human rights abuses, and also from its generation of a 
culture of corruption and impunity by allowing criminals to return to the streets.
70
  Thus, it seems 
plausible that the majority of Mexicans would perceive the innocence standard and 
implementation of oral trials as a “crucial step in the transition to an open system where the 
                                                 
67
 Julie Ray, Mexico’s Citizens Ready for Improved Judicial System. GALLUP, Feb. 20, 2008, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/104455/mexicos-citizens-ready-improved-justice-system.aspx.  Survey results were 
based on random interviews with approximately 1,000 adults, aged 15 and older.  
68
 See Magaloni, supra note 50. 
69
 Nancy J. Blake & Kathleen Blake Bohne, The Judicial System in Mexico (pt. 1), OPEN DEMOCRACY, Aug. 7, 
2009, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the-judicial-system-in-mexico. 
70
 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007 226-27 (2007). 
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power of the state is balanced by the rights of the accused, who would be transformed from a 
subject under the law, to a citizen protected by it.”71   
However, these statistics and the negative reputation of the judiciary among the 
population do not comport with some of the public’s attitude toward these two reforms.  At a 
time when many Mexicans, particularly along the U.S. border, fear for their lives on a daily 
basis, there has been anxiety that these reforms will simply make it easier for criminals to evade 
conviction and continue ravaging communities.
72
  In other words, in the midst of a security 
crisis, Mexicans want security.  One striking illustration of this sentiment was a rally involving 
the citizens and mayor of Salina Cruz, who protested the reforms, believing they would lead to 
the release of a suspect who was likely involved in the murder of a 10-year old girl.
73
  As 
captured in one protestor’s remarks, “Oral trials only protect the criminals”;74 in Salina Cruz, the 
saying goes, “What use is the concept of innocent until proven guilty if there is no way of ever 
proving anyone’s guilt?”75  Based on this view, it would seem possible that some Mexicans 
would have even supported Colombia’s faceless justice approach.76    
This perception in Salina Cruz was shared in Oaxaca as well, where the police had to 
suspend training courses on the new reforms due to protests after the local court released an 
alleged car thief in an oral trial.
77
  The view in some communities is that the release of someone 
who is presumed guilty “ignites more rage and indignation than the incarceration of innocent 
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people.”78  Although this belief is not universal, it seems doubtful that a popular outcry for these 
reforms triggered government action.  Thus, while public demand at some level may have been a 
modest factor in the establishment of the innocence standard and implementation of oral trials, it 
was unlikely to be the primary impetus for the reforms. 
B. Hypothesis II: U.S. Pressure   
A second possible explanation for the enacted reforms is U.S. pressure on Mexico, 
through the Mérida Initiative, to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law, and to 
cement its commitment to human rights and civil liberties.  This is to say that the conditionality 
and funding provisions discussed throughout the Initiative’s planning stages, prior to the 
legislative passage of the constitutional amendment in March and June 2008, may have 
sufficiently compelled federal and state legislators in Mexico to move forward with the reform 
strategy.  A U.S.-Mexico bilateral security strategy was one of the top issues on the agenda of 
President Calderón’s first visit to the White House in November 2006.79  During subsequent 
negotiations in Mérida in March 2007, U.S. officials expressed their mounting concerns over 
Mexico’s lack of due process and the accusations of gross human rights abuses by the military.80  
While officials did not specifically “advise” Mexican policymakers to adopt reforms such as the 
innocence standard and oral trials, it was evident that Washington was very interested in seeing 
Mexico improve its record on human rights and civil liberties, and it was willing to use the 
funding as leverage to generate pro-human rights and civil liberties reforms.
81
  Recognizing that 
the United States would “‘want some concessions in exchange for the aid,’” the Mexican 
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embassy began conducting informal polls of members of the U.S. Congress during the first half 
of 2007 about the potential requisites involved in enacting the proposal.
82
 
The U.S. government manifested its position in two areas of the Initiative.  One area was 
through the proposal’s conditionality provisions, which required (a) benchmarks for promoting 
judicial reform, institution building, and the rule of law, among other goals, (b) the creation of 
military and police vetting procedures, and (c) the U.S. Secretary of State’s certification that the 
Mexican government is undertaking reforms to increase transparency, investigating allegations 
of corruption and human rights abuses, and holding military and police forces accountable for 
their actions.
83
  The second area that reflected the U.S. position was through funding provisions 
which dedicated Mérida assistance specifically to rule-of-law and judicial reform activities.
84
 
Congress set a minimal floor on the funding allocation for these activities, and the Bush 
administration proposed a fifth of total spending in the FY2008 supplemental request for reforms 
and institution-building measures.
85
   
 However, like the hypothesis on public demand, U.S. pressure for judicial reform 
through the Mérida Initiative was not likely the main catalyst for Mexico’s constitutional 
amendment.  Admittedly, the Initiative’s specific funding allocation for judicial reforms was not 
inconsequential, as Mexican policymakers were more apt to pass the “subsidized” reforms; 
indeed Mérida funds are currently paying for the training and infrastructure needed to implement 
the innocence standard and oral trial system.
86
   Furthermore, given the U.S. position toward 
human rights and civil liberties in Mexico, it is more than conceivable that support for the 
                                                 
82
 Bush’s support is delayed, PROCESO, Sept. 1, 2007, http://www.cipcol.org/?p=470 (quoting a Mexican official 
who agreed to the interview).  
83
 COLLEEN W. COOK ET AL., MERIDA INITIATIVE: PROPOSED U.S. ANTICRIME AND COUNTERDRUG ASSISTANCE FOR 
MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA 6 (2008); RAY WALSER, MEXICO, DRUG CARTELS, AND THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: A 
FIGHT WE CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE 3 (2008). 
84
 BEITTEL supra note 1, at 16. 
85
 COOK ET AL., supra note 77, at 2, 4. 
86
 USAID/Mexico’s Role in the Merida Initiative, supra note 57. 
Mohr - 17 
 
Initiative would have waned if the Mexican government attempted to implement Colombia’s 
faceless justice approach.
87
   
Nonetheless, evidence suggests that U.S. pressure may have only played a partial role in 
garnering support for these reforms.  For instance, Mexican officials pushed back when the U.S. 
Congress initially proposed more stringent conditionality provisions, and threatened to withdraw 
from negotiations.
88
  Claiming that the United States was violating Mexico’s sovereignty, one 
member of the Party of the Democratic Revolution summarized the government’s position, 
saying, “‘We are the first ones to defend the idea that Mexico needs these reforms, along with 
advances in human rights…[b]ut the United States cannot make unilateral demands.”89  Mexican 
politicians were unambiguous: they would not be beholden to U.S. bureaucrats, and they would 
enact reforms by their own initiative.
90
  Moreover, while states do seek international 
legitimacy,
91
 it is often not the driving force behind domestic legislation.  This is particularly true 
for constitutional amendments like those in Mexico, which required broad support from multiple 
levels of government, most of which are generally removed from international currents and high 
echelon negotiations with the United States.
92
  Hence, while it may have been a factor to some 
degree, there is reason to question that U.S. pressure specifically spurred support among 
Mexican policymakers for human rights and civil liberties reforms and triggered the adoption of 
the innocence standard and oral trial system. 
C. Hypothesis III: Lack of Alternatives and Colombia’s Failure 
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Given that neither public demand nor the pressure stemming from Mérida negotiations 
was the primary driving force behind these reforms, it is necessary to consider yet another 
hypothesis to justify the underlying motivations for Mexico’s particular reform strategy.  A third 
possible explanation is that policymakers were faced with a dearth of reform alternatives, and 
they recognized the fatal flaws associated with Colombia’s approach.  While it may seem overly 
simplistic, for the reasons discussed below, this is arguably one of the more plausible 
explanations for the government’s design of a criminal justice system that would bolster human 
rights and civil liberties by including the innocence standard and oral trials.  
Under such severe security conditions, Mexican officials faced the difficult challenge of 
rapidly enhancing domestic security while ensuring that their policies did not undermine the 
fundamental principles of democratic rule.
93
  Thus, their options were limited to some degree.  
They could not afford to be “weak” on crime, but neither could they turn Mexico into a police 
state.  They needed to strike a balance between pursuing an aggressive militarized strategy with 
reforms that would protect human rights and civil liberties.
94
  As President Calderón began to 
expand military operations, a growing attitude emerged that there was a “dire need for judicial 
changes amid the security crisis,”95 and the proposal for the innocence standard and oral trial 
system appeared to be one of the few politically acceptable options.  Daniel Lund, the president 
of a major Mexican polling firm, expressed this dilemma saying, “The problem is so serious no 
one knows a decent alternative at this point.”96 
Mexico’s options were further restricted by the fact that Colombia’s faceless justice 
approach did not present Mexican policymakers with a viable alternative.  This approach fell into 
                                                 
93
 MAUREEN MEYER ET AL., AT A CROSSROADS: DRUG TRAFFICKING, VIOLENCE AND THE MEXICAN STATE, 10-11 
(2007). 
94
 See id. 
95
 Gould & Caraveo, supra note 87. 
96
 Id. 
Mohr - 19 
 
disrepute in the early 2000s, and many analysts and legal professionals in both Colombia and 
Mexico have suggested that the faceless justice reforms were a complete failure.
97
  For one 
former prosecutor in Colombia, by creating other avenues for impunity and judicial discretion, 
justicia sin rostro directly contradicted some of the goals it was supposed to achieve.
98
  Many 
Mexican legislators and legal professionals have agreed.  Law professor Carlos Daza Gómez of 
the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México argued that Colombia’s approach did not 
function because it simply did not eradicate corruption or violence against the judiciary.
99
  To 
Professor Gómez and others, the introduction of the innocence standard and oral trials 
represented a more thoughtful and sophisticated solution that would concomitantly protect 
human rights and civil liberties and counterbalance the government’s military strategies.100  
Although one governor proposed the implementation of Colombia’s approach for organized 
crime cases in Mexico, the majority of Mexican legislators flatly rejected the idea, insisting that 
it would “undermine society’s confidence in the judicial process”101 and that building trust in the 
judiciary would require reforms like the innocence standard and the oral trial system. 
Given this assessment, it seems feasible that the lessons learned from Colombia’s 
experience and a limited selection of politically acceptable options were significant factors in the 
design and adoption of Mexico’s judicial reforms.  Although this may only partially explain why 
the proposal for the innocence standard and oral trial system took hold as opposed to other pro-
human rights and civil liberties reforms, it does reveal that Mexican policymakers viewed it as 
one of the only practical (and politically expedient) options for strengthening the administration 
of justice and the rule of law in the midst of the security crisis.         
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Conclusions 
The preceding analysis sought to uncover possible justifications for Mexico’s recent 
judicial reform strategy, specifically by examining reform efforts in Colombia and Mexico.  It 
began with an overview of the security conditions in both Colombia and Mexico, highlighting 
the unfortunate parallels of the drug war that has cost each country thousands of innocent lives.  
Within this context, the paper canvassed a contrast in the judicial reform approach between the 
two countries.  On the one hand, Colombia pursued a strategy based on the concept of faceless 
justice, which undercut judicial legitimacy and fundamental principles of human rights and civil 
liberties, and ultimately failed.  On the other hand, Mexico adopted a constitutional amendment 
that embodies its commitment to human rights and civil liberties by guaranteeing the 
presumption of innocence standard and the right to an oral trial in criminal cases.  Despite the 
international attention that Mexico’s reforms received, it remained relatively unclear what 
factor(s) induced the passage of this amendment. 
This paper evaluated three hypotheses, and argued that neither public demand nor 
pressure by the United States was a significant factor in prompting the enactment of the 
innocence standard and oral trial system.  This is not to contend that these variables had no part 
in incentivizing Mexican policymakers; rather, they were likely secondary motivations.  The 
paper analyzed a third hypothesis, and based on the evidence presented above, posited that the 
absence of reform alternatives and the failings of Colombia’s faceless justice approach were 
central to the implementation of these pro-human rights and civil liberties reforms. 
This being said, the hypotheses above by no means compose an exhaustive list, and much 
remains open for discussion.  This paper established an initial framework for further dialogue on 
why Mexico pursued this road to reform amid its security crisis by suggesting that it was 
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principally motivated by a lack of options and the fatal flaws embedded within the faceless 
justice approach.  Although only the future will reveal whether Mexico’s reforms take hold in 
practice, they nonetheless illustrate a significant move by the government to respect and uphold 
human rights and civil liberties.  Hopefully this analysis will stir a debate and lead to a better 
understanding of the motivations behind these historic and positive reforms. 
